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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 057920

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TAGS: [OSCE](#) [PREL](#) [EU](#) [NATO](#) [PGOV](#)
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: ENGAGING ALLIES ON EUROPEAN
SECURITY AND THE CORFU MINISTERIAL

Classified by: EUR Assistant Secretary Phil Gordon -
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: The Greek OSCE Chairmanship has called an informal Ministerial on the Island of Corfu to discuss European Security Architecture, responding primarily to a Russian call for a radical overhaul of current institutional arrangements and focused primarily on "hard" security. The U.S., while always open to constructive ideas for improving security, believes that the current security architecture, based on NATO, the OSCE, and the EU, has been extraordinarily successful in promoting a stable and prosperous Europe. The Corfu Ministerial presents an invaluable opportunity for the U.S. to channel discussion in a productive direction, centering the dialogue within the OSCE framework, and basing it fundamentally on the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security. We envision Corfu as launching a positive, wide-ranging dialogue on European security, but one which does not pre-judge the outcome of the talks (i.e., result in a summit) nor set a timetable. Our focus will be on establishing guidelines for dialogue aimed at strengthening and improving where possible an already very strong institutional system, with the results of this dialogue to be assessed at the December 1-2 OSCE Ministerial in Athens and decisions taken on how to proceed. To kick off this process, the Department asks that Embassies in NATO and EU capitals present this to host governments and that USNATO schedule an instructed discussion at NATO, based on the points and paper in paragraphs 5 and 6. These initial consultations at NATO will be followed quickly by consultations in Vienna and demarches in all remaining OSCE capitals. End summary and action request.

12. (C) In a speech in Berlin on June 5, 2008, and again in an April 20, 2009 speech in Helsinki, Russian President Medvedev called for a new set of formal (preferably treaty-based) European hard security arrangements covering conflict resolution, arms control, and alliances. Medvedev provided few details at that time, and details have remained scarce. The U.S. is and will remain open to constructive ideas. Russian explanations of its proposal, however, have focused largely on general principles -- territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers and non-use of force in settling disputes -- that Russia's actions in Georgia since August 2008 appear to contradict. Russia's call for adherence to new obligations under international law would also appear to contradict its unilaterally "suspending" its implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Russia has also pressed for language that seems designed to circumscribe NATO, such as guarantees: not to secure one's own security at the expense of others; not to allow the development of any military alliance that would be to the detriment of the security of others; not to allow one state or international organization to have exclusive rights to support peace and

stability in Europe. Russian authorities have asserted that the potential accession of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO is a violation of previous commitments made by Allies after the breakup of the Soviet Union - a claim that we have consistently rejected. The Russians also claim the placement of missile defense elements in the Czech Republic and Poland are the beginning of a structure that could potentially threaten its strategic capabilities - a view that we also have countered. Because of these concerns, Russia has sought an effective veto over NATO expansion, and a say in the placement elements of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in Europe.

13. (C) The Russian proposals do not address the "soft" side of security -- the human and economic security dimensions, as defined by the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents, which are of particular importance to the U.S. and Europeans. Nor is it clear where security arrangements like CFE or the Vienna Document fit in Russia's envisioned architecture, since Moscow has said the European Security Treaty idea is not an arms control proposal. Russian has recently indicated that it is prepared to engage on CFE on a separate track on the basis of the parallel actions package -- an approach endorsed by all Allies. Still, these and other issues -- including in particular Russian actions in

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Georgia -- will continue to color the context in which discussions on European security will move forward.

14. (C) Despite the lack of specificity to Medvedev's proposals and suspicions of Russian motivations, most European countries are pressing for -- or at least willing to undertake -- a dialogue on Medvedev's proposal. The European desire for dialogue provides an opportunity for U.S. leadership in redefining the scope of the discussion to be a positive agenda for dialogue about strengthening existing security institutions based on the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security. At Corfu, the Secretary plans to note that while we are prepared to have an airing of concerns about European security, debate should focus on concrete steps the international community should take to address real security challenges we face today, including implementation of existing commitments. The U.S. also believes that a summit should be held only when there is summit-worthy substance to announce, not as a precursor to a process that may or may not achieve real results.

15. (C/REL) While we do not expect that Allies will speak from a common script at Corfu, USNATO should work to ensure that Allies agree on the general approach. Principally, USNATO should work to achieve consensus that:

-- We should use Corfu to launch a constructive dialogue on ways to enhance European security. A useful way forward would be to propose an "agenda for dialogue" that addresses key issues in each of the three interrelated security dimensions.

-- This process should be open-ended. At least at the outset, this dialogue would have no fixed timeline and no fixed outcome; rather, the results of the discussions would determine whether additional security arrangements, or adjustments to current arrangements, might be necessary. The December OSCE ministerial in Athens would provide a useful opportunity to review the results of the dialogue to date and provide further direction.

TALKING POINTS:

- The United States is ready to talk about European security in response to President Medvedev's proposal, and we are ready to launch a constructive dialogue.

- This dialogue should take place primarily at the OSCE and be structured to reflect the OSCE's comprehensive definition of security, with its political-military, economic, and human dimensions.
- This dialogue must include a discussion of existing commitments and institutions and a review of how well we are using these institutions and fulfilling our commitments.
- We think the existing security institutions have done a good job, although there may be some scope to perfect their work -- perhaps by improving their ability to respond to crises such as the Russia-Georgia conflict in August 2008 and to better promote settlement of the protracted conflicts.
- We also recognize that many security issues that are major concerns today (e.g., terrorism, radicalization, climate change, energy security, non-state actors) either did not exist or were less urgent when the Helsinki Final Act and subsequent commitments were agreed; it is timely to discuss whether Euro-Atlantic institutions can do more to address them.
- We would suggest that we propose at Corfu an "agenda for dialogue" that would identify themes for discussion in each of the three interrelated dimensions of security.
- In the area of human rights and democracy, we should consider: a mechanism for OSCE to conduct independent investigations of human rights violations; advancing freedom of the press by establishing norms for the protection of journalists; and expanding OSCE efforts to address human trafficking and tolerance issues.
- In the economic and environment dimension, we should consider new ways the OSCE could address the security and human implications of climate change and promote energy security.
- In the political-military dimension, we should consider: whether there are institutional changes that could improve

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our ability, collectively, to respond to crises; how to develop concepts and practices that allow the international community to engage effectively when some participants in a crisis are separatist regimes or other non-state actors; how to move forward on Europe's protracted conflicts; how to better address 21st century security issues (e.g., non-proliferation, counter-terrorism, control of CBRN material); the potential role for the OSCE in "hard security" programs (e.g., border security, police and customs training, counter narcotics).

- In the coming days U.S. Embassies in all OSCE capitals and the U.S. delegation in Vienna will be approaching the governments of all OSCE participating States to outline the U.S. vision for the Corfu Ministerial.

End talking points.

16. (SBU/REL) In Fall 2008, and again in Spring 2009, the U.S. circulated among NATO Allies a non-paper of general principles for responding to Medvedev's proposal. As we move forward in our efforts to shape a constructive dialogue on European security, these remain our guiding principles.

Begin text of non-paper:

In reference to our upcoming discussion on the Russian proposals for a new European Security Treaty, we suggest

the following principles for NAC consideration and agreement:

-- Russia needs to explain exactly what it is proposing, how it treats existing security frameworks, and why Allies should engage with Russia on this initiative at a time when Russia has failed to honor its commitments under existing agreements, particularly those involving respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;

-- We already have good institutions -- OSCE, COE, NATO, and EU -- which are already available for engagement with Russia;

-- Any discussions on improving pan-European/Euro-Atlantic security should be based on the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and related OSCE documents;

-- We should maintain and, where possible, enhance the comprehensive concept of security that includes the human and economic dimensions, as well as the political-military aspects;

-- Any discussion with Russia should take place in Vienna with all concerned parties, but NATO should coordinate positions in advance, similar to the way we handle CFE issues (i.e., discussions in the HLTF in Brussels and JCG-T in Vienna).

End text of non-paper.
CLINTON